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The aggregation of many independent estimates can outperform the most accurate 
individual judgment1-3. This centenarian finding1, 2, popularly known as the “wisdom of 
crowds”3, has been applied to problems ranging from the diagnosis of cancer4 to 
financial forecasting5. It is widely believed that social influence undermines collective 
wisdom by reducing the diversity of opinions within the crowd. Here, we show that if a 
large crowd is structured in small independent groups, deliberation and social 
influence within groups improve the crowd’s collective accuracy. We asked a live crowd 
(N=5180) to respond to general-knowledge questions (e.g., what is the height of the 
Eiffel Tower?). Participants first answered individually, then deliberated and made 
consensus decisions in groups of five, and finally provided revised individual 
estimates. We found that averaging consensus decisions was substantially more 
accurate than aggregating the initial independent opinions. Remarkably, combining as 
few as four consensus choices outperformed the wisdom of thousands of individuals.  
Understanding the conditions upon which humans benefit from collective decision-
making has puzzled mankind since the origin of political thought6. Theoretically, aggregating 
the opinions of many unbiased and independent agents can outperform the best single 
judgment1, which is why crowds are sometimes wiser than their individuals2, 3. This principle 
has been applied to many problems which include predicting national elections7, reverse-
engineering the smell of molecules8, and boosting medical diagnoses4. The idea of wise 
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crowds, however, is at odds with the pervasiveness of poor collective judgment9. Human 
crowds may fail for two reasons. First, human choices are frequently plagued with numerous 
systematic biases10. Second, opinions in a crowd are rarely independent. Social interactions 
often cause informational cascades, which correlate opinions, aligning and exaggerating the 
individual biases11. This imitative behaviour may lead to herding9, a phenomenon thought to 
be the cause of financial bubbles12, rich-get-richer dynamics13, 14, and zealotry15. Empirical 
research has shown that even weak social influence can undermine the wisdom of crowds16, 
and that collectives are less biased when their individuals resist peer influence17. Extensive 
evidence suggests that the key to collective intelligence is to protect the independence of 
opinions within a group. 
However, in many of those previous works, social interaction was operationalized by 
participants observing others’ choices without discussing them. These reductionist 
implementations of social influence may have left unexplored the contribution of deliberation 
in creating wise crowds. For example, allowing individuals to discuss their opinions in an online 
chat room results in more accurate estimates18, 19. Even in face-to-face interactions, human 
groups can communicate their uncertainty and make joint decisions that reflect the reliability 
of each group member20, 21. During peer discussion, people also exchange shareable 
arguments22, 23, which promote the understanding of a problem24. Groups can reach 
consensuses that are outside the span of their individual decisions24, 25, even if a minority26 or 
no one24 knew the correct answer before interaction. These findings lead to the following 
questions: can crowds be any wiser if they debated their choices? Should their members be 
kept as independent as possible and aggregate their uninfluenced, individual opinions? We 
addressed these questions by performing an experiment on a large live crowd (Fig 1A, see 
also Supplementary Video 1).  
We asked a large crowd (N=5180, 2468 female, aged 30.1±11.6 years) attending a 
popular event to answer eight questions involving approximate estimates to general 
knowledge quantities (e.g., what is the height in meters of the Eiffel Tower? c.f. Methods). 
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Each participant was provided with pen and an answer sheet linked to their seat number. The 
event’s speaker (author M.S.) conducted the crowd from the stage (Fig. 1A). In the first stage 
of the experiment, the speaker asked eight questions (Supplementary Table 1) and gave 
participants 20 seconds to respond to each of them (stage i1, left panel in Fig. 1A). Then, 
participants were instructed to organize into groups of five based on a numerical code in their 
answer sheet (see Methods). The speaker repeated four of the eight questions and gave each 
group one minute to reach a consensus (stage c, middle panel in Fig. 1A). Finally, the eight 
questions were presented again from stage and participants had 20 seconds to write down 
their individual estimate, which gave them a chance to revise their opinions and change their 
minds (stage i2, right panel in Fig. 1A).  Participants also reported their confidence in their 
individual responses in a scale from 0 to 10. 
Responses to different questions were distributed differently. To pool the data across 
questions, we used a non-parametric normalising method, used for rejecting outliers27 (see 
Methods). Normalising allowed us to visualize the grouped data parsimoniously, but all our 
main findings are independent of this step (Supplementary Fig. 1). As expected, averaging 
the initial estimates from 𝑛 participants led to a significant decrease in collective error as 𝑛 
increased (F(4,999)= 477.3, p~0; blue lines in Fig. 1B), replicating the classic wisdom-of-
crowd effects 2. The average of all initial opinions in the auditorium (N=5180) led to 52% error 
reduction compared to the individual estimates (Wilcoxon sign rank test, z=61.79, p~0). 
We then focused on the effect of debate on the wisdom of crowds, and studied whether 
social interaction and peer discussion impaired16, 17 or promoted23, 24 collective wisdom. To 
disentangle these two main alternative hypotheses, we looked at the consensus estimates. 
We randomly sampled 𝑚 groups and compared the wisdom of 𝑚 consensus estimates (stage 
c) against the wisdom of 𝑛 initial opinions (stage i1, 𝑛 = 5 𝑚 since there were 5 participants 
on each group). This analysis is based on the 280 groups (1400 participants) that had valid 
data from all of their members (see Methods).  We observed that the average of as few as 3 
collective estimates was more accurate than the mean of the 15 independent initial estimates 
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(blue line at 𝑛 = 15 vs. black line at 𝑚 = 3 in Fig. 1B, z=13.25, p=10-40). The effect was even 
more clear when comparing 4 collective choices against the 20 individual decisions comprising 
the same 4 groups (blue line at 𝑛 = 20 vs. black line at 𝑚 = 4 in Fig. 1B, z=20.79, p=10-96). 
Most notably, the average of 4 collective estimates was even more accurate (by 49.2% 
reduction in error) than the average of the 1400 initial individual estimates (blue data point at 
𝑛 = 1400  vs. black line at 𝑚 = 4 in Fig 1B, z=13.92, p=10-44). In principle, this could simply 
result from participants having a second chance to think about these questions, and providing 
more accurate individual estimates to the group discussion than the ones initially reported. 
However, our data rules out this possibility since one or two collective estimates were not 
better than 5 or 10 independent initial estimates respectively (z=1.02, p=0.31). In other words, 
this is the result of a crowd of crowds (Fig. 1C).  
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Fig.1. Aggregating debates and the wisdom of crowds. (A) A live crowd (N=5180) answered general knowledge 
questions in three stages. Left: initial individual estimate (stage i1). Middle: consensus (stage c). Right: revised 
individual estimate (stage i2). In stage c, a moderator (white) recorded the group’s consensus estimate. (B) 
Normalized error of the average of 𝑛 individual answers (blue line for stage i1, red line for stage i2), and normalized 
error of the average of 𝑚 = 𝑛/5 collective estimates (black line, stage c). Bars are s.e.m. (C) Minimum number of 
collective decisions needed to significantly (α = 0.01) outperform crowds of different sizes. At least 2 group 
estimates (from 10 individuals) are needed to outperform the wisdom of 5 independent individuals, and 3 estimates 
(from 15 individuals) are needed to outperform the wisdom of 10 independent estimates. For these crowd sizes, 
the wisdom of crowds is more efficient than aggregating debates. However, averaging 4 collective decisions leads 
to estimates that are significantly more accurate than the wisdom of crowds of any size. 
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Participants used the chance to change their minds after interaction and this reduced 
their individual error (mean error reduction of 31%, z=19.16, p=10-82). More importantly, 
revised estimates gave rise to greater wisdom of crowds compared to initial estimates (blue 
line vs. red line in Fig. 1B, F(1,999)= 4458.6, p~0). When compared to collective choices, the 
average of 𝑛 revised decisions was overall more accurate than the average of 𝑚 group 
decisions (black line vs. red line in Fig. 1B, F(1,999)= 2510.4, p~0), although this depended 
on the specific question asked (interaction F(3,999)= 834.7, p~0; see Supplementary Fig. 1).  
Taken together, these findings demonstrate that face-to-face social interaction brings 
remarkable benefits in accuracy and efficiency to the wisdom of crowds. These results raise 
the question of how social interaction, which is expected to instigate herding, could have 
improved collective estimates.    
Several observations about the bias and variance of the distributions of estimates help 
understanding our results (Fig. 2). Fig. 2A shows a graphical representation of how 
deliberation and social influence affected the distribution of responses in two exemplary 
groups. We found that the consensus decisions were less biased than the average of initial 
estimates (Fig. 2B, z=2.15, p=0.03, see also Supplementary Fig. 2). This indicates that 
deliberation led to a better consensus than what a simple averaging procedure (with uniform 
weights) could achieve. When participants changed their mind, they approached the (less 
biased) consensus: revised opinions became closer to the consensus than to the average of 
initial answers (Fig. 2C, z=27.15, p=10-162). Moreover, in line with previous reports that social 
influence reduces the diversity of opinions16, 17 we found that, within each group, revised 
responses converged towards each other: the variance of revised estimates within each group 
was smaller than the variance of the initial estimates (Fig. 2D, Wilcoxon sign rank test of the 
variance of responses on each group before vs after interaction, z=18.33, p=10-75). However, 
interaction actually increased the variance of responses between groups (Fig. 2E): the 
distribution of the average of initial estimates (obtained by averaging stage i1 estimates on 
each group) had less variance than the average of revised estimates (obtained by averaging 
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stage i2 estimates on each group, squared rank test for homogeneity, p<0.01). Previous 
research in social psychology also found a similar effect; consensus decisions are typically 
more extreme than the average individual choice, a phenomenon known as ‘group 
polarization’28.  
Previous studies have proposed that a fundamental condition to elicit the wisdom-of-
crowds effect is the diversity of opinions3, 29. Because we saw that interaction decreased the 
variance of estimates within groups but increased the variance between groups, we reasoned 
that sampling opinions from different groups might bring even larger benefits to the crowd. To 
test this idea, we sampled our population in two ways to test the impact of within- and between-
group variance on the wisdom of crowds (Fig. 2E). In the within-groups condition, we sampled 
𝑛 individuals coming from 𝑚 = 𝑛/5 different groups. This was the same sampling procedure 
that we used in Fig. 1B. In the between-groups sampling, we selected 𝑛 individuals, each 
coming from a different group. Because different groups were randomly placed in different 
locations in the auditorium, we expected that sampling between-groups would break the effect 
of local correlations, and decrease the collective error. 
Consistent with our predictions, we found that breaking the local correlations by 
between-group sampling led to a large error reduction (red solid line vs. red dashed line in 
Fig. 2F, 26% error reduction on average, F(1,999)= 25824.1, p~0). In fact, averaging only 5 
revised estimates coming from 5 different groups outperformed the aggregation of all initial 
independent decisions in the auditorium (z=25.91, p=10-148). This finding is consistent with 
previous studies showing that averaging approximately 5 members of “select crowds” leads 
to substantial increases in accuracy30, 31. In our case, adding more decisions using this 
sampling procedure led to a significant decrease in error (F(4,999)= 249.34, p~0). Aggregating 
revised estimates from different randomly sampled groups was a highly effective strategy to 
improve collective accuracy and efficiency, even with a very small number of samples. 
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Fig. 2. The effect of deliberation on bias and variance. (A) Schematic illustration of the process of deliberation 
in two groups (circles or triangles) answering the question GOALS (see Supplementary Table 1) across the three 
stages of the experiment. Vertical dashed lines show the mean of each group. The range of opinions within each 
group decreased going from i1 to i2 (dotted black lines). The range of the average opinions (distance between 
vertical dashed lines) increased after deliberation. (B) Consensus decisions (grey bar) were less biased than the 
simple average of initial estimates in the group (blue bar). Bars show mean bias (signed error) and s.e.m. (C) 
Revised estimates (obtained in stage i2) were closer to the consensus decision (grey bar) than to the average of 
initial estimates (blue bar). Bars show mean distance and s.e.m. (D) Individuals conformed to the group consensus. 
Deliberation decreased the diversity of opinions within groups. Bars show variance within-groups (mean ± s.e.m.) 
before (blue bar) and after (red bar) deliberation. (E) Deliberation led to polarization of opinion and pulled groups 
to wider extremes in the opinion space. This process increased the diversity of opinions between different groups. 
The between-groups variance is obtained by taking the mean estimate on each group and computing the variance 
of this distribution across groups. The inset shows the distribution of mean estimates before (blue) and after (red) 
deliberation. Bars show variance between-groups. (F) We aggregated the individual estimates in two different 
ways: either by sampling participants all from the same groups (within-groups condition) or by sampling each 
participant from a different interacting group (between-groups condition). The insets sketch these two conditions; 
participants shaded by the same color were averaged together. The y-axis shows the normalised error of the 
average of 𝑛 individual answers at stage i2 for the within-groups condition (solid line) and the between-groups 
condition (dashed line). Sampling participants who interacted in different debates leads to more accurate estimates. 
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We then asked whether deliberation was necessary to observe an increase in the 
wisdom of crowds. One could argue that the difference between wisdom of crowds obtained 
by aggregating the first (i1) versus the second (i2) opinions may have simply resulted from 
having a second chance to produce an estimate. Indeed, previous research32-34 has shown 
consistent improvements drawn from repeatedly considering the same problem in decision 
making. To evaluate this possibility, we compared wisdom of crowds obtained from the 
answers to the discussed versus the undiscussed questions (see Methods). Fig. 3A shows 
the error reduction when comparing the average of 𝑛 revised estimates (i2) to the average of 
𝑛 initial estimates (i1) i.e., the ratio of red line to blue line in Fig 1B. We observed that the error 
reduction in the absence of deliberation (Fig 3A, grey line) was below 3% for all crowd sizes. 
With deliberation (Fig 3A, green line), on the other hand, error reduction was significantly 
larger and increased with increasing the number of aggregated opinions (F(1,999)= 3963.6, 
p~0, comparing with- vs without deliberation). This result demonstrated that merely having the 
chance to produce a second estimate was not sufficient, and that deliberation was needed to 
the increase the wisdom of crowds. 
While we found that deliberation increased collective accuracy, the results presented 
so far do not shed light on the specific deliberative procedure implemented by our crowd. In 
principle, collective estimates could have been the output of a simple aggregation rule different 
to the mean17, 35. Alternatively, participants could have used the deliberative stage to share 
arguments, and arrive to a new collective estimate through reasoning22, 23. This dichotomy 
between ‘aggregating numbers’ versus ‘sharing reasons’ has been discussed in several 
studies about collective intelligence36, 37. It has been argued that the normative strategy in 
predictive tasks is to share and aggregate numbers. Instead, problem-solving contexts require 
authentic deliberation and sharing of arguments and reasons37. Which kind of deliberative 
procedure did the groups implement in our experiment?  
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Fig. 3. The superior wisdom of deliberative crowds. (A) Collective accuracy in the absence of deliberation. 
Error reduction between averaging n revised estimates compared to averaging n initial estimates, expressed as 
percentual decrease. The green line shows the mean error reduction in the discussed questions and the grey line 
shows the same for the questions that remains undiscussed. Bars depict s.e.m. (B) Simple aggregation rules fail 
to explain the accuracy of deliberative crowds. Normalized error of averaging 100 randomly chosen collective 
decisions (black bars) versus averaging simulated estimates produced by seven simple aggregation rules (blue 
bars). Aggregation rules: (1) resistance to social influence, (2) confidence-weighted average, (3) expert rule, (4) 
median, (5) soft median, (6) mean, (7) robust average. See Methods for details about these rules. (C) We tested 
if four consensus choices could consistently and reliably outperform the wisdom of crowds. Aggregating 4 
consensus estimates collected in the lab (Experiment 2) was more accurate than aggregating all 5,180 individual 
estimates from the crowd (Experiment 1). The y-axis shows error in normalized units (see Methods) and the error 
bar depicts s.e.m.   
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Deliberation Procedure 
Question 1 Question 2 Question 3 Question 4 
“We shared arguments and reasoned together” 
8.0 ± 0.2 (10) 7.5 ± 0.2 (10) 7.9 ± 0.2 (10) 7.4 ± 0.3 (8) 
“We followed the individuals who verbally 
expressed higher confidence during the debate” 
6.4 ± 0.3 (8) 6.0 ± 0.3 (8) 6.1 ± 0.3 (8) 6.9 ± 0.3 (10) 
“We discarded the estimates that were most far 
away from the mean” 
5.4 ± 0.3 (0) 5.0 ± 0.4 (0) 5.5 ± 0.4 (0) 5.3 ± 0.4 (0) 
“We followed the individuals who had reported  
higher confidence in the initial stage” 
5.2 ± 0.4 (0) 4.6 ± 0.4 (0) 4.6 ± 0.4 (0) 5.1 ± 0.4 (0) 
“We averaged our estimates” 
5.0 ± 0.4 (0) 4.4 ± 0.3 (0) 4.0 ± 0.3 (0) 3.5 ± 0.4 (0) 
“We followed the individuals who were least 
willing to change their minds” 
2.3 ± 0.3 (0) 2.4 ± 0.3 (0) 2.1 ± 0.3 (0) 3.3 ± 0.3 (0) 
 
Table 1. Deliberation procedures implemented during the debates, as reported by the participants. In 
Experiment 2, we replicated our main findings and asked participants to report the extent to which different 
deliberation procedures contributed to reaching consensus. Participants used a Likert scale from 0 to 10 (see 
Methods for details). The table show the mean rating ± s.e.m. for each question and procedure. Between brackets, 
we show the mode of the distribution of ratings (see also Supplementary Fig. 4). Procedures were sorted by mean 
rating, but participants rated them in randomized order. Question 1: GOALS. Question 2: ALEGRIA. Question 3: 
ROULLETTE. Question 4: OIL BARREL. (See Supplementary Table 1 for details). 
 
To answer this question, we first compared the accuracy of our consensus estimates 
with 7 different aggregation rules for how to combine the initial estimates (see Methods). 
Three of these rules were based on the idea of robust averaging38, namely that groups may 
underweight outlying estimates (i.e., the median rule, the soft median rule and the robust 
averaging rule, see Methods for details). Three other rules were inspired in previous studies 
showing that the one individual may dominate the discussion and exert greater influence in 
the collective decision21 (i.e., the expert rule, the confidence-weighted average rule, and the 
resistance-to-social-influence rule, see Methods for details). As a benchmark, we also 
compared these rules with the simple average rule. Fig. 3B shows the expected error if our 
crowd implemented each of these rules (blue bars in Fig. 3B). The empirically obtained 
consensus estimates (black bar in Fig. 3B) were significantly more accurate than all 7 
aggregation rules (z>3.99, p<10-5 for all pairwise comparisons between the observed data and 
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all simulated rules). The deliberation procedures implemented by our crowd could not be 
parsimoniously explained by the application of any of these simple rules.  
The above analysis definitively rejects the more simplified models of consensus. But 
the evidence is not exhaustive and does not necessarily imply positive evidence for the 
hypothesis that our crowd shared arguments during deliberation. To directly test this 
hypothesis, we ran a second experiment in the lab (Experiment 2, N=100, see Methods and 
Supplementary Fig. 3). Groups of 5 people first went through the experimental procedure 
(Fig. 1A). After finishing the experiment, in a debriefing questionnaire, we asked them what 
deliberation procedure(s) they implemented during the debates. After the end of stage i2 (c.f. 
Fig. 1A), all participants were asked to rate (in a Likert scale from 0 to 10) the extent to which 
different deliberation procedures contributed to reaching consensus (see Table 1 and 
Supplementary Fig. 4). The procedure with highest endorsement was “We shared arguments 
and reasoned together” (mean rating across all questions: 7.7±0.2, mode rating: 10; z>7.05, 
p<10-12 for all comparisons, Table 1). We gave participants the opportunity to endorse more 
than one procedure or even describe a different procedure not appearing in our list. This latter 
option was selected less than 5% of the times (4.2 ± 2.0 %). Overall, our control analyses and 
new experiment suggest that (i) without deliberation there is no substantial increase in 
collective accuracy (Fig. 3A), (ii) the most salient simple aggregation rules previously 
proposed in the literature did not explain our findings (Fig. 3B), and (iii) participants reported 
sharing arguments and reasoning together during deliberation (Table 1). 
Experiment 2 also allowed us to probe the wisdom of deliberative crowds by design. 
Since the materials (questions) and procedures were identical between the two experiments, 
we could formally test whether aggregating the consensus estimates (stage i2) drawn from 4 
groups of 5 people collected in the lab could predictably and consistently outperform the 
aggregate of all independent opinions (stage i1) in the crowd. We found that the average of 
four group estimates collected in Experiment 2 was significantly more accurate than the 
average of all 5,180 initial estimates collected from the crowd (z=6.55, p<10-11, Fig. 3C). It is 
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difficult to overstate the importance of these findings as they call for re-thinking the importance 
of the deliberation structure in joint decision-making processes. This study opens up clear 
avenues for optimising decision processes through reducing the number of required opinions 
to be aggregated.   
Our results are in contrast with an extensive literature on herding11 and dysfunctional 
group behavior39, which exhorts us to remain as independent as possible. Instead, our findings 
are consistent with research in collaborative learning showing that “think-pair-share” 
strategies40 and peer discussion24 can increase the understanding of conceptual problems. 
However, these findings offer a key novel insight largely overlooked in the literature on 
aggregation of opinions: pooling together collective estimates made by independent, small 
groups that interacted within themselves increases the wisdom-of-crowds effect. The potential 
applications of this approach are numerous and range from improving structured 
communication methods that explicitly avoid face-to-face interactions41, to the aggregation of 
political and economic forecasts42 and the design of wiser public policies43. Our findings thus 
provide further support to the idea that combining statistics with behavioural interventions 
leads to better collective judgments18. While our aim was to study a real interacting crowd, 
face-to-face deliberation may not be needed to observe an increase in collective accuracy. In 
fact, previous research has shown that social influence in virtual chatrooms could also 
increase collective intelligence19,20.  
The first study on the wisdom of crowds was regarded as an empirical demonstration 
that democratic aggregation rules can be trustworthy and efficient2. Since then, attempts to 
increase collective wisdom have been based on the idea that some opinions have more merit 
than others and set out to find those more accurate opinions by pursuing some ideal non-
uniform weighting algorithm17, 31, 35. For example, previous studies proposed to select 
‘surprisingly popular’ minority answers35 or to average the responses of ‘select crowds’ defined 
by higher expertise31 or by resistance to social influence17. Although these methods lead to 
substantial improvements in performance, implementing simple majority rules may still be 
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preferred for other reasons which may include sharing responsibility44, promoting social 
inclusion39, and avoiding elitism or inequality45, 46. Here, we showed that the wisdom of crowds 
can be increased by simple face-to-face discussion within groups coupled with between-group 
sampling. Our simple -yet powerful- idea is that pooling knowledge from individuals who 
participated in independent debates reduces collective error. Critically, this is achieved without 
compromising the democratic principle of ‘one vote, one value’47. This builds on the political 
notion of deliberative polls, as a practical mechanism to solve the conundrum between equality 
and deliberation, as more and more people’s voices are asked to make a decision and 
massive deliberation becomes impractical48, 49. Here, we demonstrated that in questions of 
general knowledge, where it is easy to judge the correctness of the group choice and in the 
absence of strategic voting behaviour50, aggregating consensus choices made in small groups 
increases the wisdom of crowds. This result supports political theories postulating that 
authentic deliberation, and not simply voting, can lead to better democratic decisions51.  
Methods 
Context  
The experiment was performed during a TEDx event in Buenos Aires, Argentina 
(http://www.tedxriodelaplata.org/) on September 24, 2015. This was the third edition of an 
initiative called TEDxperiments (http://www.tedxriodelaplata.org/tedxperiments), aimed at 
constructing knowledge on human communication by performing behavioural experiments on 
large TEDx audiences. The first two editions studied the cost of interruptions on human 
interaction52, and the use of a competition bias in a “zero-sum fallacy” game53.  
Materials 
Research assistants handled one pen and one A4 paper to each participant.  The A4 paper 
was folded on the long edge and had four pages. On page 1, participants were informed about 
their group number and their role in the group. The three stages of the experiment (Fig. 1A) 
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could be completed in pages 2, 3, and 4, respectively. On page 4, participants could also 
complete information about their age and gender. 
Experimental procedure 
The speaker (author M.S.) announced that his section would consist in a behavioral 
experiment. Participants were informed that their participation was completely voluntary and 
they could simply choose not to participate or withdraw their participation at any time. A total 
of 5180 participants (2468 female, mean age 30.1 years, s.d.: 11.6 years) performed the 
experiment.  All data were completely anonymous. This experimental procedure was 
approved by the ethics committee of CEMIC (Centro de Educación Médica e Investigaciones 
Clínicas Norberto Quirno). A video of the experiment (Supplementary Video 1) is available 
in https://youtu.be/ND2-qRPERfk.  
Stage i1: individual decisions 
The speaker announced that, in the first part of the experiment, participants would make 
individual decisions. Subjects answered eight general knowledge questions that involved the 
estimation of an uncertain number (e.g., what is the height in meters of the Eiffel Tower?). 
Each question (Supplementary Table 1) had one code (e.g. EIFFEL) and two boxes. 
Participants were instructed to fill the first box with their estimate, and the second box with 
their confidence in a scale from 0 to 10. Before the beginning of stage i1, the speaker 
completed one exemplary question in the screen, and then read the eight questions. 
Participants were given 20 seconds to answer each question. 
Stage c: collective decisions 
In the second part (stage c), we asked participants to make collective decisions. First, they 
were instructed to find other members in their group according to a numerical code found in 
page 1. Each group had six members, and all participants were seated next to each other in 
two consecutive rows. The speaker announced that there were two possible roles in the group: 
player or moderator. Each group had five players and one moderator. Each participant could 
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find their assigned role in page 1 (e.g., “You are the moderator in group 765” or “You are a 
player in group 391”). Players were instructed to reach a consensus and report it to the 
moderator in a maximum of 60 seconds. Moderators were given verbal and written instructions 
to not participate nor intercede in the decisions made by the players. The role of the 
moderators was simply to write down the collective decisions made by the players in their 
group. Moderators were also instructed to write down an ‘X’ if there was lack of consensus 
among the group. Groups were asked to answer four of the eight questions from stage i1 (see 
Supplementary Table 1). The speaker read the four questions again, and announced the 
moments in which time was over. 
Stage i2: Revised decisions 
 Finally, participants were allowed to revise all of their individual decisions and confidence, 
including the ones that remained undiscussed. The speaker emphasized that this part was 
individual, and read all eight questions of stage i1 again. 
Data collection and digitalization 
At the end of the talk, we collected the papers as participants exited the auditorium. Over the 
week following the event, five data-entry research assistants digitalized these data using a 
keyboard. We collected 5180 papers: 4232 players and 946 moderators. Many of these 946 
potential groups had incomplete data due to at least one missing player; overall, we collected 
280 complete groups. All data reported in Fig. 1 is based on those 280 complete groups (1400 
players). For the comparison between individual, collective, and revised estimates, we focus 
on the four questions answered at stage c. 
Non-parametric normalization 
The distributions of responses were spread around different values on each question 
(Supplementary Figure 1). To normalize these distributions, we used a non-parametric 
approach inspired in the outlier detection literature 27. We calculated the deviance of each data 
point 𝑥𝑖 around the median, and normalized this value by the median absolute deviance 
17 
 
𝑛𝑖 =
𝑥𝑖 − 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝒙)
𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(|𝒙 − 𝑚𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑛(𝒙)|)
, 
where 𝒙 is the distribution of responses. This procedure could be regarded as a non-
parametric z-scoring of the data. 
The rationale for normalizing our data was twofold. First, we used this procedure to reject 
outliers in the distribution of responses. Following previous studies27, we discarded all 
responses with that deviated from the median in more than 15 times the median absolute 
deviance. The second purpose of normalization was to average our results across different 
questions. This helps the visualization of our data, but our findings can be replicated on each 
question separately without any normalization (Supplementary Fig. 1).  
Data analysis 
To compute all our curves in Fig. 1, we subsampled our crowd in two different ways: either by 
choosing 𝑛 individuals that interacted in 𝑚 = 𝑛/5 different groups (within-groups sampling) or 
by choosing 𝑛 individuals from 𝑛 different groups (between-groups sampling). All curves in 
Fig. 1B and the solid line in Fig. 2E were based on the within-groups sampling condition; the 
dashed line in Fig. 2E is from the between-groups sampling condition. For a fair comparison 
between conditions, we computed the errors using exactly the same subsamples in our crowd. 
For each value of 𝑛, we considered 1,000 iterations of this subsampling procedure.  
In the case of 𝑛 = 5, each iteration randomly selected 5 of our 280 complete groups 
(Fig 2E sketches one exemplary iteration). In the within-groups condition, we computed the 
crowd error of each of the 5 groups (the error of the average response in stages i1 and i2, and 
the error of the collective response in stage c) respecting the identity of each group. Finally, 
we averaged the 5 crowd errors and stored their mean value as the within-groups error for this 
iteration. In the between-groups sampling, we combined responses from individuals coming 
from different groups. We computed the error for 1,000 random combinations contingent on 
[1] 
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the restriction that all individuals belonged to different groups. Finally, we averaged all crowd 
errors and stored this value as the between-groups error for this iteration. 
The same procedure was extended for 𝑛 > 5. We randomly selected 𝑛 of our 280 
groups on each of our 1,000 iterations. In the within-groups condition, we selected all possible 
combinations of 𝑛 individuals coming from 𝑚 groups, and computed their crowd error. We 
averaged the crowd error for all possible combinations and stored this value as the within-
groups error for this iteration. In the between-groups condition, we randomly selected 1,000 
combinations of 𝑛 individuals coming from 𝑛 different groups, and computed their crowd error. 
We averaged all of these crowd errors and stored this value as the between-subjects error for 
this iteration.  
All error bars in Fig. 1 and 2 depict the normalised mean ± s.e.m. of the crowd error 
across iterations. Pairwise comparisons were performed through non-parametric paired tests 
(Wilcoxon sign rank tests). To test the general tendency that error decreases for larger crowds, 
we used two-way repeated-measures analysis of variance (rm-ANOVA) with factors question 
and crowd side 𝑛, and iteration as repeated measure.  
Aggregation Rules 
We evaluated if collective estimates could result from 7 simple aggregation rules (Fig. 3B). All 
of these rules predict that the collective estimate 𝑗 is constructed using a weighted average of 
the initial estimates 𝑥𝑖 with weights 𝑤𝑖, 
𝑗 =  ∑ 𝑤𝑖 𝑥𝑖 .
5
𝑖=1
 
In Fig. 3B, the seven rules were sorted by accuracy. Rule 1 is an average weighted 
by resistance to social influence. This procedure simulates that, during deliberation, the group 
follows the individuals who were least willing to change their minds, presumably because they 
had better information17. Resistance to social influence was quantified as the inverse linear 
[2] 
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absolute distance between the initial (𝑥𝑖) and revised (𝑟𝑖) estimates. This quantity was used to 
compute the weights 
𝑤𝑖 =
∑ |𝑟𝑗 − 𝑥𝑗 + 𝜀|
−1
𝑗
|𝑟𝑖 − 𝑥𝑖 + 𝜀|
, 
where 𝜀 is a constant to prevent divergence when 𝑥𝑗 = 𝑟𝑗. We simulated this rule using different 
values of 𝜀 ranging from 0.1 to 1000, and used the value with highest accuracy (𝜀 = 1). In Rule 
2 (the ‘confidence-weighted average rule’), the group uses the initial confidence ratings as 
weights in the collective decision, 𝑤𝑖 = 𝑐𝑖/ ∑ 𝑐𝑗𝑗 . In Rule 3, which we call the ‘expert rule’, the 
group selects the estimate of the most confident individual in the group. This rule is defined 
by 𝑤𝑖 = 1 for 𝑖 = argmax(𝐜), and 𝑤𝑘 = 0 for 𝑘 ≠ 𝑖, where 𝐜 is a vector with the five initial 
confidence ratings in the group. 
Rule 4 consists in simply taking the median of the initial estimates, which is equivalent 
to giving a weight 𝑤𝑖 = 1 to the third largest estimate in the group, and 𝑤𝑘 = 0 to all other 
estimates. Rule 5 is the simple mean, namely 𝑤𝑖 = 0.2 for all 𝑖. Rule 6, which we call “soft 
median”, is a rule that gives a weight of 𝑤𝑖 = 0.5 to the third largest estimate, weights of 𝑤𝑘 =
0.25 to the second and fourth largest estimates, and 𝑤𝑙 = 0 to the smallest and largest 
estimates in the group. Finally, Rule 7 is a robust average: this rule gives a weight 𝑤𝑖 = 0 to 
all estimates in the group that differ from the mean in more than 𝑘 orders of magnitude, and 
equal weights to all other estimates. We simulated this rule using different values for 𝑘 ranging 
from 1 to 10, and used the value with highest accuracy (𝑘 = 4). 
Experiment 2 
N=100 naïve participants (56 female, mean age: 19.9 years, s.d.: 1.3 years) volunteered to 
participate in our study. Participants were undergraduate students at Universidad Torcuato Di 
Tella, and were tested as 20 groups of 5. The instructions and procedures were identical to 
the main task described above. At the end of the experiment, all individuals completed a 
questionnaire about the deliberation procedure implemented during the task. We asked them 
[3] 
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to rate (in a Likert scale from 0 to 10) the extent to which different deliberation procedures 
contributed to reaching consensus for each question. They rated six different procedures (see 
Table 1 and Supplementary Fig. 4), which appeared in randomized order. We also gave 
them the possibility to choose “Other” and describe that procedure.  
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Supplementary Figures 
 
 
 
 
Supplementary Figure 1. Error as a function of crowd size for each question. Each panel 
show the same as Fig. 1B for each question separately and without normalization. Blue lines 
show the error obtained by averaging 𝑛 individual answers at stage i1, red lines show the 
same for stage i2, and black lines show the error of averaging 𝑚 collective estimates (black 
lines, stage c). All lines show the mean across 1,000 random within-group sub-samples of 
crowd; the s.e.m. is within the thickness of each line. A) GOALS: How many goals were scored 
in the 2010 FIFA World Cup? B) ALEGRIA: How many times does the word “alegría” (joy) 
appear in the lyrics of the song “Y dale alegría a mi corazón”? (“Give joy to my heart”) C) 
ROULETTE: What is the sum of all numbers in a roulette wheel? D) OIL BARREL: How much 
did a barrel of oil cost in 1970 (in US dollars cents)? 
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Supplementary Figure 2. Distribution of responses relative to the correct answer. On 
each question, the top panel is the normalized histogram of responses obtained at stage i1 
(blue solid line). The vertical dashed line is the mean of that distribution. The bottom panel 
show the distribution of mean estimates on each group (blue dashed line) and the distribution 
of consensus decisions of each group (black line). If the consensus reflected an average with 
uniform weights for each participant, then these two distributions should be identical. However, 
we observe that in the four questions, collective answers are less biased than the mean of all 
initial estimates of each group (black dashed line is closer to 0 than the vertical dashed line). 
This is why the wisdom of m collective answers is more accurate than the wisdom of n=m/5 
initial estimates. Each panel A-D shows a different question. See Supplementary Table 1 for 
more details. 
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Supplementary Figure 3. Replication in a lab experiment. 20 groups of 5 individuals 
performed our experiment in a lab setting. The figure shows the normalized error across the 
four discussed questions for crowds with different number of individuals. The only difference 
between this figure and Fig. 1b is that it was produced with 100 (instead of 1,000) random 
subsamples of the population. This is because we have a sample size of 100 subjects 
compared to the 1,400 used in the main experiment. Blue line: average of n initial estimates. 
Black line: average of n/5 collective estimates. Red line: average of n revised estimates. The 
error bars denoting s.e.m. are within the thickness of the lines. 
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Supplementary Figure 4. Distribution of ratings in the lab experiment. For each 
deliberation procedure, bars show the distribution of ratings across all questions. As in Table 
1, procedures were sorted by mean rating but participants observed them in randomized order. 
The procedure with highest rating was “We shared arguments and reasoned together” (7.7 ± 
0.2). The second highest rating was for “We followed individuals who verbally expressed 
higher confidence during the debate” (6.3 ± 0.3). We found that this procedure (based on 
verbal communication of confidence) was perceived to contribute significantly more to the 
consensus than the procedure based on reported confidence (“We followed the individuals 
who had reported higher confidence in the initial stage”, 4.9 ± 0.4). This is consistent with a 
previous study showing that aggregation rules based on confidence reports are suboptimal 
and hinder collective intelligence (Büchel, B., Klössner, S., Lochmüller, M., & Rauhut, H. 2017. 
The Strength of Weak Leaders–An Experiment on Social Influence and Social Learning in 
Teams. Working papers SES. Université de Friburg). 
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Question Code Correct 
Answer 
Mean Median Median 
Absolute 
Deviance 
Discussed 
in groups? 
How many goals were scored in the 
2010 FIFA World Cup? 
GOALS 145 107.9 81 38 Yes 
How many emperors did the Roman 
Empire have? 
EMPERORS 131 19.5 10 5 No 
How many times does the word 
“alegría” (joy) appear in the lyrics of the 
song “Y dale alegría a mi corazón”? 
(“Give joy to my heart”) 
ALEGRIA 21 26.7 21 9 Yes 
How many calories are there in 200 
grams of butter? 
BUTTER 1480 1251.3 600 400 No 
What is the sum of all numbers in a 
roulette wheel? 
ROULLETTE 666 705.9 400 250 Yes 
How much did a barrel of oil cost in 
1970 (in US dollars cents)? 
OIL BARREL 180 6445.4 150 138 Yes 
What is the height of the Eiffel tower in 
meters? 
EIFFEL 324 344.4 200 110 No 
How many elevators are there in the 
Empire State Building of Ney York? 
ELEVATORS 73 18.6 11 6 No 
 
 
Supplementary Table 1. Questions, correct answers, and summary statistics of the 
distribution of responses before interaction (stage i1). From the eight questions asked in stage 
i1, half of them were discussed in groups (stage c). Distributions were normalized using a non-
parametric method based on the median (column 5) and the median absolute deviance 
(column 6). See Equation [1] in Methods for details.  
 
Supplementary Video 1. A video describing the experimental procedure and showing the 
crowd performing the experiment is available at https://youtu.be/ND2-qRPERfk.  
